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Preface
The U.S. Congress passed the Banking Act of 1933 (aka Glass-
Steagall) to correct the abuses of the national banking system
that stemmed from the involvement of commercial banks in
securities underwriting, which allegedly contributed to the Great
Depression by fueling rampant speculation. The purpose of the
Act was to prevent the exposure of commercial banks to the risks
of investment banking and to ensure stability of the financial sys-
tem. A proposed solution to the current financial crisis is to
return to the basic tenets of this New Deal legislation.  
Senior Scholar Jan Kregel provides an in-depth account of the
Act, including the premises leading up to its adoption, its influ-
ence on the design of the financial system (e.g., formalizing the
difference between the short-term and long-term use of funds),
and the subsequent collapse of the Act’s restrictions on securities
trading (deregulation). He concludes that a return to the Act’s sim-
ple structure and strict segregation between (regulated) commer-
cial and (unregulated) investment banking is unwarranted in light
of ongoing questions about the commercial banks’ ability to com-
pete with other financial institutions. Another concern is the abil-
ity to adopt new regulations that would prevent a repeat collapse
of the Act’s original restrictions on securities trading. Moreover,
fundamental reform—the (conflicting) relationship between state
and national charters and regulation—was bypassed by the Act.
In essence, the Act provided the unregulated investment
banks with a monopoly over securities market activities. Moreover,
both the commercial and investment banks provide liquidity:
the former by creating deposits and the latter by structuring the
liabilities issued by borrowers. Thus, investment banks were
functionally equivalent to the deposit and liquidity-creation
business of regulated banks. While the Act provided monopoly
protection for the commercial banks’ business model, which was
locked into issuing commercial loans, it did not give these banks
a monopoly on the creation of liquidity. Over time, other finan-
cial sectors offered similar products with fewer restrictions and
lower costs (e.g., through structures such as securitization, the
commercial paper market, and money market mutual funds, and
through the process of “riskless arbitrage”). 
The regulated banks sought to compete in the marketplace
by expanding their lending into longer maturities. Ultimately,
the Securities and Exchange Commission allowed these banks to
operate affiliates that were neither regulated nor consolidated for
financial reporting purposes, while other regulators provided a
level playing field that included the ability to engage in (high-
risk) activities such as credit derivatives. When the liquidity cri-
sis occurred in 2008, it resulted in a collapse of security values, an
insolvency in securitized structures, and a withdrawal of short-
term funding. The safety net that was created to respond to a run
on bank deposits was totally inadequate to address a capital mar-
ket liquidity crisis.
Kregel observes that an alternative source of revenue has to
be found for the regulated banks without undermining their pro-
tections, and that regulators, legislators, and the judiciary have to
agree on a precise definition and the powers to carry out permis-
sible banking activities. One approach is to recognize deposit tak-
ing as a public service and to regulate it as a public utility, with a
guaranteed return on regulated costs. Another approach is to treat
wealth and transaction services as a public service by a regulated
utility such as a national giro payments system, thus eliminating
the need for deposit insurance and the lender-of-last-resort func-
tion of the Federal Reserve. Both short- and long-term finance and
funding would be provided by private investment funds or trusts
monitored by securities regulators, but without the need for a gov-
ernment guarantee. 
In spite of his proposed solutions, Kregel acknowledges that
the conundrum of prohibiting regulated banks from engaging
in the least costly method of short-term business financing, com-
bined with the inability of legislating monopoly deposit protec-
tions similar to the 1933 Act without prohibiting competitive
innovations by nonregulated institutions, remains unresolved. 
As always, I welcome your comments.
Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, President




Recently, a number of authoritative voices have called for a return
to the New Deal Glass-Steagall legislation as the most appropriate
response to the clear failure of the 1999 Financial Modernization
Act to provide stability of the financial system. However, a clear
understanding of the 1933 Banking Act, along with subsequent
regulatory interpretation and legislation, suggests that this would
be difficult, if not impossible. A new Glass-Steagall Act would have
to be substantially different from the original, and some of the
internal structural contradictions that led to its demise remedied.
What Was Glass-Steagall Trying to Do?
First, it is important to note that the legislation, produced in
slightly less than three months, was considered a stopgap meas-
ure that was enacted following three years of crisis and drew
extensively on reform proposals that had been under discussion
since the establishment of the National Monetary Commission
in 1908 and the subsequent creation of the Federal Reserve System.
Indeed, the main proposal—the separation of banking and
finance—had been proposed by Louis D. Brandeis (1914) in his
famous condemnation of the financial system during the 1907
financial crisis. In Senate bills introduced in 1932, Carter Glass
had already proposedelimination of securities dealing by national
charter banks (although he seems to have reversed his opinion by
the time of the Banking Act of 1935; see Edwards 1938, 297); in
particular, limitations on brokers’ loans (Time 1932a, 1932b).
Deposit insurance had been introduced by several statesstarting
in the late 1880s and was included in legislation sponsored, also
in 1932, by Henry Steagall in the House of Representatives (see
FDIC 1984, chapter 3). It was eventually introduced as an
amendment to the draft Senate bill to form the basis for the
Banking Act of 1933. Proposals to limit the interest on interbank
deposits—an attempt to curtail the transfer of excess funds from
country banks to Wall Street—were also under discussion
(Klebaner 1974, 138), and the role of correspondent banks’ secu-
rities accounts in the collapse of a number of Midwest savings
banks (in the run-up to the bank holidays imposed by Roosevelt
in March) gave the measure added importance. Winthrop
Aldrich, head of Chase National Bank, had publicly proposed
separating national banks from their affiliates, and he later
drafted the section (21) of the 1933 Act prohibiting any “person,
firm, corporation, association, [or] business trust” dealing in
securities from accepting deposits (Johnson 1968, 156). Aldrich’s
proposal brought unchartered private partnerships into the
purview of the reform bill (Ferguson 1984, 82). Thus, the major
elements of the 1933 legislation were readily available to an
administration willing to act expeditiously.
Nonetheless, the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency
Report on the Act (S. Rep. No. 77, 73rd Cong., 1st sess., 1933)
emphasized “that immediate emergencies were so great that it
was wise to defer the preparation of a completely comprehen-
sive measure for the reconstruction of our banking system, such
as had been urged by some responsible men. Hence, the Committee
resolved to construct a bill to correct the manifest immediate
abuses, and to bring our banking system back into stronger con-
dition” (cited in Wyatt 1941, 56, note 9). What were these “imme-
diate abuses” and “completely comprehensive” measures?
The Immediate Abuses
A good summary2of these immediate abuses is contained in the
1982 decision of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals, A.G. Becker, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System: 
Congress passed the Glass-Steagall Act in 1933, in response
to what it perceived to be the abuses which resulted from
the involvement of commercial banks in securities under-
writing. Congress considered that commercial banks, by
underwriting stocks, had fueled the rampant speculation
that preceded the Great Depression. Congress’ principal
concern in amending the banking laws, however, was to pro-
tect the solvency and integrity of the banks themselves. . . .
Throughout its debates on the causes of the imperiled state
of the banking industry, Congress . . . focused its attention
on the commercial banks’ participation in “speculative”
securities markets: their extensive underwriting of long-
term holdings of high risk stocks and bonds.
For example, the Senate Report on the Act notes that
“[t]he outstanding development in the commercial bank-
ing system during the prepanic period was the appearance 
of excessive security loans, and of over-investment in securi-
ties. . . . [A] very fruitful cause of bank failures . . . has beenLevy Economics Institute of Bard College 5
the fact that the funds of various institutions have been so
extensively ‘tied up’ in long-term investments.” Congress con-
demned “the excessive use of bank credit in making loans for
the purpose of stock speculation. . . .” In short, the purpose
of the Act was to reverse “a loose banking policy which had
turned from the making of loans on commercial paper to the
making of loans on security.”
Congress passed the Glass-Steagall Act to correct these
abuses. The Act is a prophylactic measure designed to pre-
vent commercial banks from being exposed to the dangers
which inevitably followed upon their participation in invest-
ment banking. “Congress acted to keep commercial banks
out of the investment banking business largely because it
believed that the promotional incentives of investment
banking and the investment banker’s pecuniary stake in the
success of particular investment opportunities was destruc-
tive of prudent and disinterested commercial banking and
of public confidence in the commercial banking system.”
Congress accomplished the separation of commercial
and investment banking in sections 16 and 21 of the Glass-
Steagall Act. . . . Section 16 provides that a bank “shall not
underwrite any issue of securities or stock” and shall not
“purchase . . . for its own account . . . any shares of stock of
any corporation.”. . . Section 21 of the Act . . . forbids banks
from underwriting “stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or
other securities.”
The basic abuses were deposit-taking banks’ underwriting
of and investment in securities, lending to finance the acquisition
of securities (through money center banks’ use of correspondent
deposits to fund brokers’ loans), and margin lending to retail
clients. The integrity of the public’s holding of deposits in banks
was to be insured by prohibiting deposit takers from these activ-
ities, and by preventing banks engaged in these activities from
taking deposits.
The Comprehensive Measures
Competition between the states and the federal government has
existed since the ratification of the Constitution, which forbids
states the right to issue debt or currency, and Alexander Hamilton’s
assumption of the colonies’ defaulted debt as federal government
liabilities. The 1836 decision to allow the Bank of the United States
to lapse left the provision of a fiduciary currency to the states,
which maintained the right to charter banks. The federal gov-
ernment attempted to reassert its control over the circulating
currency with the creation of national banknotes under the
National Bank Act of 1863, but the state banks responded quickly,
offering deposits subject to check as an alternative means of pay-
ment and credit creation. By the turn of the century, state banks
had once again become dominant.
This was partly due to a 1902 ruling by the comptroller of
the currency limiting investments by national banks to any sin-
gle borrower and curtailing the right of the large New York
national banks to deal in and underwrite securities. State banks
were not subject to these restrictions and national charter banks
formed state-chartered affiliates to evade them. The use of such
affiliates was dealt with in section 20 of the 1933 Act, which spec-
ified that “no member bank shall be affiliated in any manner . . .
with any corporation, association, business trust, or other simi-
lar organization engaged principally in the issue, flotation,
underwriting, public sale, or distribution at wholesale or retail or
though syndicate participation of stocks, bonds, debentures,
notes, or other securities” (FRB 1933, 398). And section 32 pro-
vided that “no officer or director of any member bank shall be an
officer, director, or manager of any corporation, partnership, or
unincorporated association engaged primarily in the business of
purchasing, selling or negotiating securities, and no member
bank shall perform the functions of a correspondent bank on
behalf of any such individual, partnership, corporation, or unin-
corporated association and no such individual, partnership, 
corporation, or unincorporated association shall perform the
functions of a correspondent for any member bank or hold on
deposit any funds on behalf of any member bank” (ibid., 401).
Thus, the problem of conflicting federal and state regula-
tions had existed since the colonial period. It became acute for
the national banking system in other areas besides securities
trading, particularly in the creation of bank branches and, after
1914, in the asymmetry created by the government’s allowing
state banks to be members of the Federal Reserve System while
enjoying the benefits of more lenient state charters. The existence
in many states of free charters, leading to a predominance of
small unit banks, also created what was presumed to be a weak-
ness in the U.S. banking system, since a small unit system was
thought to be less stable than one comprising a lesser number of
larger banks, as in Canada. The more “comprehensive measures”
referred to by the Senate committee involved the unification of
regulation at the federal level, possibly involving “a constitutionalPublic Policy Brief, No. 107 6
investment banks, and (5) trust companies. “For the most part,”
he writes, “the development of investment banking has been in
the charge of the state governments, the national government
taking no interest in it until very recently. . . . It is therefore
broadly true that nearly all the legislation relating to investments
and investment banking is the product of the several states”
(ibid., 106–08).
Section 21 of the 1933 Act simply formalized this difference
between the short-term and long-term use of funds by making
it unlawful for any type of business enterprise dealing in securi-
ties “to engage at the same time to any extent whatever in the
business of receiving deposits subject to check or to repayment
upon presentation of a passbook, certificate of deposit, or other
evidence of debt, or upon request of the depositor” (FRB 1933,
398). It thus provided member banks with a monopoly on such
deposit business, subject “to periodic examination by the
Comptroller of the Currency or by the Federal reserve bank of
the district” and to the requirement that each bank “make and
publish periodic reports of its condition” (ibid.).
Following Brandeis’s admonition, the intention was to
shield public deposits from exposure to or use in any capital mar-
ket activities, and, in particular, to prevent member banks from
owning or dealing in equity. To reinforce the point, section 13 of
the Banking Act states: “No member bank shall (1) make any
loan or any extension of credit to, or purchase securities under
repurchase agreement from, any of its affiliates, or (2) invest any
of its funds in the capital stock, bonds, debentures, or other such
obligations of any such affiliate, or (3) accept the capital stock,
bonds, debentures, or other such obligations of any such affiliate
as collateral security for advances made to any person, partner-
ship, association, or corporation, if, in the case of any such affil-
iate, the aggregate amount of these loans, extensions of credit,
repurchase agreements, investments, and advances against such
collateral security will exceed 10 per centum of the capital stock
and surplus of such member bank, or if, in the case of all such
affiliates, the aggregate amount of such loans, extensions of cred-
its, repurchase agreements, investments, and advances against
such collateral security will exceed 20 per centum of the capital
stock and surplus of such member bank,” with an overcollateral-
ization of 20 percent on the value of all such operations (FRB
1933, 395). Thus, the difference in operation between commercial
and investment banks is based on the former’s ability to receive
deposits and a limitation on the nature of their investments to
short-term, self-liquidating business loans. 
amendment or some equally far-reaching measure necessitating
a long postponement of action” (A.G. Becker 1982). 
Correcting the Manifest Abuses Produces a
Financial Structure
Although considered stopgap measures, the restrictions on the
immediate abuses had very clear consequences for the design of
the financial system. One set of financial institutions would be
responsible for taking deposits and making short-term loans to
commercial and industrial clients through the creation of credit
in the form of new deposits. This simply reaffirmed the belief in
the applicability of the “real bills” doctrine that had been the
basis of the discussions that led to the creation of the Federal
Reserve System. A second set of institutions would be responsi-
ble for the long-term financing of capital investment through
the underwriting and initial and secondary distribution of secu-
rities: bonds and equity. 
A 1921 text on American banking by H. Parker Willis, a for-
mer secretary of the Federal Reserve Board and professor of
banking at Columbia University, reflects the desired financial
structure. It stresses the need 
to make plain the difference between the investment bank or
banking house and the commercial bank. . . . In the case of
the commercial bank, we have an institution which tests and
analyzes credit, guarantees it, and undertakes to redeem on
demand the obligations which it has incurred on behalf of
its own customers. . . . The underlying thought in banking
in the commercial sense of the term is thus intimately asso-
ciated with the idea of short term, or power to liquidate, and
is the direct antithesis of investment, or long-term use of
funds. Whenever a commercial bank begins to allow its
funds to be “tied up,” that is to say, closely involved or
absorbed in long-term operations, it has started upon the
road to disaster. . . . The whole object and purpose of invest-
ment is thus very different from that of banking. An invest-
ment house or investment bank underwrites issues of stocks
and bonds by reputable concerns, and sells them to its
investing customers. (Willis 1921, 108 ff.)
Willis lists American institutions that have to do with the
investment function as (1) savings banks, (2) building loan asso-
ciations, (3) land or mortgage banks, (4) investment houses orLevy Economics Institute of Bard College 7
However, Willis’s analysis of the activity of commercial
banks goes beyond receiving deposits and stresses a more impor-
tant function of banks, viz: “supplying purchasing power in some
form to persons who need it. Or, to state the thought in another
way, it is that of guaranteeing the limited or individual purchas-
ing power represented by the obligation of each individual, by
accepting it and substituting in lieu thereof the bank’s own obli-
gation” (Willis 1921, 3). That is, the individual borrower “has
simply substituted the bank’s obligation of more general accept-
ability for his own obligation of limited acceptability” (ibid.).
This corresponds to Hyman P. Minsky’s observation that “the
fundamental banking activity is accepting, that is, guaranteeing
that some party is creditworthy. . . . A bank loan is equivalent to
a bank’s buying a note that it has accepted” (2008 [1986], 256).
Minsky also notes that a bank’s ability to do this depends on its
liabilities’ carrying a higher liquidity premium than its invest-
ment assets (277). Banks therefore have two quite separate func-
tions: the receipt and safekeeping of deposits, and the creation of
liquidity for its borrowers through the acceptance function, earn-
ing income for this service to its clients in the form of a net inter-
est margin, less charge-offs. “The bank thus appears as an
institution for the study of individual solvency and liquidating
power and for guaranteeing its judgment on the subject. This
process of study and guarantee is called the extension of credit, and
the bank is properly defined as a credit institution” (Willis 1921, 4).
Willis stresses this dual nature of a bank’s deposit business,
noting “the clear meaning of the term ‘deposit’—something
deposited or left. As a matter of fact, it must be regarded as a
totally erroneous conception of the bank ‘deposit’ when viewed
from the general standpoint of credit. . . . Suppose a would-be
borrower, A, who has property or is known to be in a thoroughly
solvent condition, goes to a bank and negotiates a loan. That loan
may be allowed him, not in the form of actual coin currency, but
simply in the form of an entry in a passbook. In return for this
entry, the borrower leaves with the bank his own note secured
or unsecured by collateral” (23–24). Thus, banks are institutions
that create liquidity through leverage and are recompensed for
this by the premium on their deposits relative to their assets and
on their ability to avoid losses by appropriate study of the sol-
vency of borrowers (i.e., the liquidity premium on the assets). 
It is this ability to “create” deposits in the act of lending that
provides bank income. A Federal Reserve analysis of “Commercial
Bank Operations,”written after the passage of the 1933 Act, notes
that it is “considered desirable for [a bank’s] income producing
assets to hold some promise of ready convertibility into cash. The
paramount consideration in connection with such assets, how-
ever, is how to get the most interest income with the least risk.
Loans are the traditional employment for bank funds. . . . The
form of a loan most favored by tradition is the short-term com-
mercial loan; that is, a credit based on a productive or distributive
process, which, in its fruition, provides the funds with which to
repay the loan. . . . It is usually for short periods of time and the
transaction it covers supplies security for the loan. The appraisal
of credit risk in such a loan is comparatively easy. . . . Credit analy-
sis, as practiced by banks, is a highly developed art. Its practi-
tioners have devised elaborate statistical measures involving
balance sheet and income statement ratios. Large banks have spe-
cially trained staffs for this sort of work. Small banks, particularly
those in compact and more or less self-contained communities,
are in a position to depend largely upon intimate knowledge of
local conditions and borrowers” (Robinson 1941, 179–80).
Thus, while the Act limits the “receipt of deposits” to mem-
ber banks, it also limits the way banks can use deposits to create
liquidity for its clients to particular types of investments—what
are generally called commercial and industrial (C&I) loans.
However, commercial banks are not unique in the creation of
liquidity. Even without the ability to receive or create deposits,
investment banks also create liquidity by underwriting and pri-
mary distribution of a borrower’s obligations, and by providing
secondary distribution through the market-maker broker-dealer
function in organized securities markets. In this way, they render
investments in long-term capital assets into what may be con-
sidered “liquid” investment securities. This has been recognized
as both a benefit and a drawback. As John Maynard Keynes
observes in his General Theory(1936), “with the development of
organised investment markets, a new factor of great importance
has entered in, which sometimes facilitates investment but some-
times adds greatly to the instability of the system. In the absence
of security markets, there is no object in frequently attempting to
revalue an investment to which we are committed. But the Stock
Exchange revalues many investments every day and the revalua-
tions give a frequent opportunity to the individual (though not
to the community as a whole) to revise his commitments” (150–
51). As a result, “investment becomes reasonably ‘safe’ for the
individual investor over short periods,” and “investments which
are ‘fixed’ for the community are thus made ‘liquid’ for the indi-
vidual.” By acting as broker-dealers making liquid markets in secu-
rities, investment banks support the role of organized securitiesPublic Policy Brief, No. 107 8
ulated banks. In any event, both the protected deposit business
and the creation of liquidity based on deposit creation were
eroded by competition from nonmember investment banks that
were not restricted to a particular business model. Indeed,it was
not the receipt of customer deposits of currency that had to be
protected but rather liquidity creation, or the acceptance func-
tion, if the separation of commercial and investment banks was
to be sustainable. Once investment banks could provide these
liquidity-creatingservices more cheaply than regulated banks, the
latter’s business model became untenable, and with it the logic of
the Glass-Steagall separation of commercial and investment banks.
Glass-Steagall Created a Monopoly That Was 
Bound to Fail
For supporters of free-market liberalism, the decline of member
banks as the providers of liquidity through insured deposit cre-
ation was simply an expression of the inefficiencies of a de facto
cartel. For example, Kenneth E. Scott (1981) notes that “the
Banking Act, in a manner consistent with the economic thinking
that characterized that period, sought to deal with the problems
of the depression by creating an industry cartel to divide markets
and fix prices, in the name of preventing that excessive compe-
tition which was seen as the major cause of business failure and
economic depression. In essence, the Banking Act of 1933 under-
took to create a buyers’ cartel among banks, restraining compe-
tition among them for demand deposits and for time and savings
deposits”(40).
According to George G. Kaufman (1988), “most of the indi-
vidual proposals focused on increasing bank safety by decreasing
competition in a particular area. . . . [Thus] the Act, taken as a
whole, was blatantly anticompetitive.… The commercial banking
sector became progressively disadvantaged relative to other sec-
tors that could offer similar products with fewer restrictions. . . .
Today, there is general agreement among economists that most,
if not all, of the restrictions imposed by the Banking Act no
longer are necessary, if they ever were, at least for restricting risk”
(184–85).
However, the disintegration of the protection of member
banks’ deposit business was as much due to the conscious decisions
of regulators and legislators to weaken and suspend the protec-
tions of the Act, and to provide explicit support for the compet-
itive innovations of nonmembers banks, as it was to the triumph
of market forces over monopoly. Indeed, it would be possible to
markets in transforming long-term fixed assets into short-term
liquid assets (153).
While a commercial bank creates liquidity by insuring that
its liabilities have a higher liquidity premium than its assets and
thus can always be exchanged for currency, investment banks
provide liquidity by insuring that the liabilities they underwrite
have a higher liquidity premium than the capital assets they
finance and thus can be bought or sold in organized markets
without a great variation in price. Both provide liquidity; they
just do it in different ways: the former by creating deposits, the
latter by structuring the liabilities issued by borrowers. The Act
granted commercial banks monopoly protection over this type
of liquidity creation, but that protection also meant that their
business model was locked in to the issuing of commercial loans.
Or, to put it another way, the Act provided monopoly protection
for a particular means of providing liquidity, but it did not give
banks a monopoly on the creation of liquidity.
The Viability of the Commercial-bank Business
Model under the 1933 Act
As pointed out in the Federal Reserve study cited above,
“Although highly regarded, the commercial loan has come to be
a progressively smaller proportion of bank assets. For one thing,
business enterprise has been centralized more in corporations
that are able to get favorable financing from the long-term secu-
rities market. In addition, improvement in transportation and
changes in inventory practices have reduced the requirements
for short-term commercial credit. As a result, banks have had to
seek employment for their funds elsewhere” (Robinson 1941,
179). As noted in Klebaner 1974, “A far-reaching ‘technical rev-
olution in debt financing’ began in the 1920s and accelerated
after 1933,” expanding the range of acceptable collateral on small
and medium firms and extending the term loan—changes that
were “far more significant quantitatively than those innovations
in collateral”(147). 
Thus, national banks had already suffered from competition
from alternative forms of liquidity creation even before their
operations were restricted to short-term commercial and indus-
trial loans—and had already begun to expand their lending into
longer maturities.Just as regulators soon reconsidered the appli-
cability of “real bills,” the financial system also moved beyond
the simple structure envisaged by the Banking Act of 1933 as a
result of a process of competition between regulated and unreg-Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 9
argue that Glass-Steagall provided the unregulated investment
banks with a monopoly over securities market activities that were
functionally equivalent to the deposit business and liquidity cre-
ation of regulated banks.
Challenges to Monopoly Protection: Thrifts and
Asset Securitization
An initial challenge to member banks’ monopoly on the receipt
of deposits came from savings and loan banks. Savings banks
were considered investment banks because of the long-term
nature of their assets and the limitations placed on deposit with-
drawals. As a result, they were excluded from the 1933 Act and
the Regulation Q limits on deposit interest rates for insured
member banks. When interest rates started to climb with infla-
tion, this provided thrifts a means of competing with member
banks for insured deposits. Deregulation in 1980 and subsequent
decisions lifted restrictions on their investments, making them
look more and more like member banks—but with more lenient
regulation. The end result was the savings-and-loan crisis, which
led to the collapse of the industry.
But the real challenge to member banks’ monopoly on 
liquidity creation came from the extension of asset securitiza-
tion to provide loans to businesses at lower financing spreads
through risk reduction and redistribution. As noted above, the
first step in this process was the use by corporations of the com-
mercial paper market as a substitute for traditional short-term
bank loans. The emergence and growth of money market mutual
funds (MMMFs) provided a growing demand for these assets,
which further encouraged the expansion of sources of nonbank
short-term paper. Finally, asset securitization provided even
greater reductions in financing costs, since MMMFs and other
investors could purchase asset-backed commercial paper
through commercial borrowing conduits. Commercial paper
thus displaced commercial bank loans, while the liabilities of
money market funds provided a substitute for member bank
deposits. 
The money market mutual fund, which first appeared in
1971, was considered a short-term investment pool subject to
registration requirements under the 1940 Investment Company
Act. In 1983, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule
2a-7 was promulgated to ensure that the underlying net asset
value of a fund’s assets would support the advertised guarantee
of a one-dollar-per-share net asset value that allowed it to com-
pete with insured member bank deposits. Just as drafters of the
National Bank Act had not foreseen the competition for national
banknotes from state banks’ deposits subject to check, legislators
in 1933 could not have foreseen the rise of commercial paper as
a substitute for C&I loans or MMMFs as a substitute for retail
deposits. At the same time, since these structures were consid-
ered capital market transactions, member banks could not
respond by entering those markets. 
Indeed, the initial attempt to enter the commercial paper
market—made in 1979 by Bankers Trust—was opposed in the
courts by representatives of investment banks. The litigation
turned on whether commercial paper should be considered
equivalent to a bank loan or to a security. Despite overwhelming
evidence to the contrary, and a positive ruling by the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court eventually ruled
that it was a security and thus an activity forbidden under the
1933 Act’s preclusion of underwriting and dealing in securities.
However, in 1984 the Supreme Court ruled that the Federal
Reserve had the authority to allow regulated banks to acquire
brokers as a subsidiary in a bank holding company (see Securities
Industry Association 1984), and in 1985 the Fed ruled that bank
holding companies could acquire as subsidiaries firms that
offered both brokerage and investment advice to institutional
customers. Interpretations issued in 1986 and 1987 further relaxed
section 20 restrictions, and then expressly allowed regulated
banks to engage in securitization via affiliation with companies
underwriting commercial paper, municipal revenue bonds, and
securities backed by mortgages and consumer debts—as long as
the affiliate did not principally engage in those activities. The
decision interpreted “principally engaged” as contributing more
than 5 percent (subsequently raised to 10 percent) of gross rev-
enues. Both rulings were subject to legal appeal by investment
banks seeking to protect themselves from encroachment from
regulated commercial banks, but both decisions were approved
by the relevant legal jurisdictions.3
The basic concept used by MMMFs was generalized in asset-
backed securitization.4 In securitized lending, in contrast to
deposit creation, liquidity is created by the structure of the bal-
ance sheet of a separate institution, such as a trust or a special
purpose entity (or vehicle). Through the magic of diversification
and aggregation, higher-risk, longer-term assets are transformed
into lower-risk, shorter-term assets, and thus, lower-liquidity
assets into higher-liquidity assets. The remuneration to liquidity
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Here, it is the pooling, diversification, and structuring of the spe-
cial purpose entity’s assets that reduces risk, along with the dis-
tribution of the assets into a large and active market that increases
liquidity and converts high-rate, risky assets into lower-rate, less
risky assets. The process has nothing to do with the creditwor-
thiness of the borrower or the ability of the bank to assess it. In
addition to the income generated from the interest spread
between long-term assets and shorter-term liabilities, fees and
commissions result from the origination of the loan, the under-
writing of the securities, and the servicing of the structure itself.
As in the case of MMMFs, these structures could only com-
pete with traditional commercial bank lending with the help of
regulatory support. As noted, securitization involves the creation
of an independent legal entity that issues liabilities that, consid-
ered as securities, should be subject to normal registration and
reporting under SEC regulations. In short, the entity should also
be considered an investment company as defined under the 1940
Investment Company Act. However, application of these regula-
tions would have largely offset the benefits of “riskless arbitrage”
noted above, and SEC Rule 3a-7, adopted in 1992, excluded vir-
tually all structured financing arrangements from being defined
as an investment company (Siclari 2001). The SEC decision
allowing shelf registration for such structures opened the way
for the generalization of “riskless arbitrage.”5
Since this process involves the creation of affiliate structures,
the underwriting of securities, and other capital market activities
that member banks could not engage in under the 1933 Act, they
were forced to seek exemptions from their monopoly protections
in order to offer similarly competitive loans to businesses. This
required the creation of special entities that could engage in such
capital market and other underwriting activities, just as the state-
chartered affiliates had done in the 1920s. And this is precisely
what insured banks sought to do with the aid of regulators
through the section 20 exemption. The SEC decision to exempt
securitization structures opened an alternative pathway for mem-
ber banks to organize and operate affiliates that were neither reg-
ulated nor consolidated for financial reporting purposes. Again,
regulators could have halted the development of asset-backed
securities, but instead chose to suspend regulations in order to
allow member banks to participate in their origination and sale.
of charge-offs from the effective assessment of the credit of bor-
rowers but from a process that focuses on the identification of
market mispricing of risk. 
This process has been described as “riskless arbitrage”: 
When one looks at any class of properly structured loans as
a national aggregate, they will perform in line with national
economic trends. If properly underwritten to statistically
significant standards, and appropriately assured against
default, variance in performance of properly pooled and val-
ued loans will be determined by national trends in interest
rates and national economic success or failure. At various
times since 1987, loans underwritten and sold in financial
markets have sometimes lived up to these underwriting
standards and have sometimes failed them miserably. For
riskless arbitrages to work appropriately, markets must pro-
duce loans worthy of reliable and predictable arbitrage. . . .
In loan arbitrage transactions, the price to arbitrage versus
the gain created by spread determines profit or loss. The
higher the “spread” the more profitable it is to pool loans
and fund them in high-grade bond markets (the arbitrage
process), assuming the ability to freely arbitrage on a con-
sistent basis. (Feldkamp 2009, 1, note 1)
However, this type of arbitrage involves the financial insti-
tution in the evaluation of a series of issues very different from
the traditional spread implicit in net margin lending. Instead of
a spread between borrowing and lending rates determined by the
bank’s ability to assess credit risk and to ensure the liquidity of
its liabilities, riskless arbitrage requires just the opposite process: 
A “riskless arbitrage” arises whenever a market participant can
acquire a commodity at a lower price in one market than the
price at which it can sell that same commodity in another
market and lock in a price differential that guarantees a
profit.… In financial market “riskless arbitrages,” participants:
(1) originate or acquire loans at a rate on the “high” side of a
rate spread and (2) “pool” them in a manner that either prop-
erly diversifies and moderates individual loan loss risk or
insures against default, provides assured servicing and collec-
tion for pool investors and, ultimately, justifies a superior rat-
ing for securities backed by the pool. The arbitrageur then sells
securities priced at the “low” side of a rate spread in amounts
that lock in a differential which guarantees profit. (Ibid.)Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 11
The Response to Challenges from 
Nonmember Banks
The challenges to the monopoly held by member banks had two
common characteristics. First, they all required what were con-
sidered securities activities, which were forbidden to regulated
banks. Second, regulatory authorities adapted existing regula-
tions to facilitate these structures and thus the ability of non-
member banks to compete with member banks as creators of
liquidity and providers of lending to business. Finally, to rem-
edy the competitive disadvantages, member banks were allowed
more and more extensive exemptions from the section 20 and
21 interdictions against dealing in securities and with security
affiliates, eroding the strict segregation provided by the original
1933 legislation. 
The response to competition from nonmember banks also
impacted the development of the structure of the financial sys-
tem. The section 20 exemption that allowed commercial banks to
engage in securitization through association with affiliates placed
a limit on earnings from activities specifically linked to securities
that was equal to a share of the affiliate’s gross income. Thus, in
order to expand their securities activities, banks had to expand
their gross non-securities-related income produced in the affil-
iates. This was done by expanding their gross repurchase busi-
ness by matching purchases and reverse repurchases in order to
reduce risks, earning a small bid-ask spread.6 This “matched
book” activity provided a large and growing market for short-
term collateralized lending that was eventually extended to all
securities, and supported increasing leverage for other non-
member financial institutions and hedge funds. This provided
another alternative channel for the creation of liquidity by non-
member banks in the system.
The combined impact of money market funds and struc-
tured securitization is to convert less-liquid, higher-risk securi-
ties into securities that appear to be more liquid and lower risk:
“riskless arbitrage.” Or, in Minsky’s terms, they provide liabili-
ties with a higher liquidity premium than assets. However, the
benefits that accrue to business borrowers in the form of lower
financing costs are made possible only by the creation of addi-
tional liquidity for the liabilities of the entities. The impact of
these structures was to allow noninsured institutions to challenge
the ability of banks to make their liabilities more liquid than
assets through deposit insurance and balance sheet regulation.
They also increased system liquidity without the same regulatory
prudential measures imposed on banks to ensure the liquidityand
price of deposit liabilities. Under the U.S. regulatory system,
money market deposit accounts and regulated bank deposits are
considered equivalent, yet the former are regulated by the SEC
and issued by investment banks, while the latter are regulated by
the Fed and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC) and issued by commercial banks.
The Liberalizing Impact of “Incidental Powers”
Although competitive innovation played an important role, it
was the legal and administrative interpretations of section 16 that
ultimately eviscerated Glass-Steagall and the protections it pro-
vided to the business model envisaged for commercial banks.
Section 16 accorded regulated banks “all such incidental powers
… necessary to carry on the business of banking” (FRB 1933,
396). Most of the exceptions that enabled commercial banks to
meet the competition from noninsured banks and led to the pro-
gressive erosion of Glass-Steagall came in later interpretations of
the phrase “incidental powers.” Already in 1981, a Supreme Court
decision affirmed that sections 16 and 21 applied only to banks
and not to bank holding companies. The FDIC thus decided that
the prohibitions of section 21 should not extend to the sub-
sidiaries of insured nonmember banks.7But it was the OCC that
was most active in extending the operation of member banks
through the liberal interpretation of “incidental powers” to cover
activities that are not specifically mentioned in section 16 as
being compatible with the “business of banking.”8
The OCC had originally applied the “look-through” princi-
ple, which allowed dealings in any financial instrument that
referred to an underlying instrument permissible under section
16. Thus, derivatives based on government securities were per-
mitted because dealings in government securities were allowed
under the 1933 Act. The OCC then shifted to the “functional
equivalence” principle. On this basis, the agency argued that,
since derivatives contracts written on instruments classified as
permissible activities had been approved, this should apply to
similar functions of derivatives. Thus, the approval of derivatives
based on government securities was extended to virtually all
assets, including commodities and equities (see Omarova 2009). 
The overall impact of these rulings was the complete rever-
sal of the original intention of preventing banks from dealing in
securities on their own account. The rulings laid the basis for the
creation of proprietary trading by banks for their own account,
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derivatives lending—both of which led to the rapid growth of
the over-the-counter market in credit derivatives. The justifica-
tion was to provide regulated institutions a level playing field
with investment banks. 
As the 1990s progressed, the only area that remained tech-
nically outside the purview of the liberalization of activities for
member banks appeared to be insurance, which had been the
regulatory preserve of state insurance regulators. However, many
of the innovations that had occurred in the insurance industry
(e.g., guaranteed investment contracts) were readily identified as
financial rather than actuarial activities and thus considered per-
missible for regulated banks. Indeed, one commentator argued
that regulated banks were already allowed to engage in all of the
securities and insurance activities eventually granted by the 1999
Financial Modernization Act, courtesy of administrative inter-
pretations that eased the limitations imposed by the 1933 Act
(Fisher 2001). 
The Regulatory Dynamic of Innovation and
Protection
The regulatory dynamic in the postwar period was one in which
nonregulated investment banks devised innovations that used
capital market activities to create products that allowed the cre-
ation of liquidity and lending accommodation to business bor-
rowers that were more competitive than could be offered by
regulated commercial banks. Rather than restraining these inno-
vations, regulators made decisions that enhanced their compet-
itiveness, placing regulated commercial banks at an even greater
disadvantage. The monopoly protections placed on deposit busi-
ness by the 1933 Act thus became a hindrance to their survival.
This growing competitive disadvantage was then used by regu-
lated institutions to argue for the elimination of the regulations
that prevented them from duplicating these structures. These
requests were invariably accepted by regulators, until there was
virtually no difference in the activities of FDIC-insured com-
mercial banks and investment banks. Since most of these inno-
vations involved what the Act considered securities activities, this
meant a slow erosion of the prohibition on dealing and invest-
ment in securities, often through a loosening of the regulations
involving affiliates. As a result, the basic principles of the 1933
Act were eviscerated even before the Financial Modernization
Act formally suspended Glass-Steagall’s protections in 1999.
Indeed, the disadvantage suffered by commercial banks due to
their monopoly protection had been largely reversed, and they
could now use their retail deposit bases to finance capital market
activities, in competition with investment banks. Having lost the
battle to preserve Glass-Steagall, the investment banks responded
by seeking an alternative source of funding, using “other peoples’
money” raised in equity markets and converting from partner-
ships to publicly quoted limited liability corporations. 
This de facto suspension of Glass-Steagall had another con-
sequence for the stability of the financial system. Liquidity cre-
ation was increasingly transferred from deposit taking by
commercial banks subject to prudential regulation, to securitized
structures that were exempt from reporting and regulation
because they were considered capital market activities and (usu-
ally) exempt from even SEC oversight. As noted above, this
process of liquidity creation was one in which longer-term,
higher-risk, lower-liquidity assets were funded through the issue
of shorter-term, lower-risk, higher-liquidity assets via special
purpose entities or the use of over-the-counter derivative loan
structures that did not require formal margining—what has
come to be known as the “shadow” banking system. In this sys-
tem, the prudential supports—legal reserves, secondary reserves,
liquidity of the C&I loan book, and access to federal lender-of-
last-resort support through the discount window—were all
absent. Thus, a liquidity crisis, such as broke out in the summer
of 1998 and again in 2008, produced, not a run on banks, but a
collapse of security values and insolvency in the securitized
structures and a withdrawal of short-term funding. The safety
net created to respond to a run on bank deposits was totally inad-
equate to respond to a capital market liquidity crisis. 
The challenge that this new system of liquidity creation
raises for those who would restore Glass-Steagall’s segregation
of deposit banking and securities market institutions is how
deposit banks can be barred from the competitive innovations in
lending that are inherently linked to the securities activities pro-
hibited under the original Act. How can commercial banks com-
pete with investment banks in providing finance for business
borrowers if they cannot deal in securities? Such segregation
would mean preventing the former from offering the most effi-
cient means of providing commercial finance through activities
such as commercial paper and asset securitization. Are these
innovations to be prohibited to all financial institutions? 
Further, given the historical experience of regulators aiding
and abetting the development of these innovations, and the
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allow these institutions to operate within them, how can regula-
tions be written to prevent a repeat of the collapse of the restric-
tions on securities trading? In particular, the question of
“incidental powers,” the Achilles heel of the 1933 Act, must be
resolved. And even if these problems could be resolved, it would
still leave open the fundamental reform that was bypassed by the
original Act—the relation between state and national charters
and regulations.
If There Is No Way Back, Is There a Way Forward?
A return to Glass-Steagall thus presents a conundrum. Since the
activities that currently provide the least costly method of short-
term business financing are fundamentally linked to securities
market activities, they would be prohibited to regulated banks. In
addition, it would appear impossible to legislate monopoly pro-
tections similar to those of 1933 for deposits without active mon-
itoring and the prohibition of competitive innovations by
nonregulated institutions. Similarly, a separation of short-term
bank financing activity from long-term funding in securities
markets would require prohibiting the structured financing and
derivatives that have largely eliminated this distinction by con-
verting long-term assets into liquid, short-term liabilities. Thus,
an alternative source of revenue would have to be found for reg-
ulated banks, requiring regulators, legislators, and the judiciary
to agree on the precise definition of permissible banking activi-
ties and the incidental powers required to carry them out. This
seems no more likely today than it was in the 1980s. Simple ref-
erence to deposit taking or to dealing in securities would no
longer appear to suffice. 
Failing the elimination of securitization and structured
derivative products, an alternative source of revenue would have
to be found that would be sufficient to prevent the regulated
banks from themselves seeking to undermine their protections.
One approach would be to recognize the activity of deposit tak-
ing as a public service and to regulate it as a public utility, with 
a guaranteed return on regulated costs. This approach would
probably involve increased costs for transaction services or some
form of government subsidy. (The “narrow banks” proposal is
one version of this approach.) But, just as deposits replaced
notes, this would alwaysleave open the possibility of a more cost-
effective innovation, providing a substitute from a nonregulated
institution. 
Resolving this problem will not be easy. Neither a restoration
of the current system, with better regulation, nor a return to 1933
will suffice. However, past reactions to crisis may provide a clue.
In 1863, the response to the instability of notes issued by “wild-
cat” banks (and the need for war financing) was the issuance of
a national banknote backed by government securities. The
response to the instability of that system in 1907 was the creation
of the Federal Reserve note. The logical progression would
appear to have been the creation of a federal deposit in response
to the use of deposits to fund speculation in securities. Instead,
the response was a federally insured deposit. However, given the
commitment of the Treasury to financing the insurance fund,
there is little difference between a federal deposit and a deposit
that is federally insured. This solved the problem of the activity
of “receiving” deposits, but it left behind the problem of deposit
creation—that is, the creation of liquidity within the private
financial system. Under Glass-Steagall, it was the separation of
activities and the presumption that bank assets would be limited
to short-term self-liquidating assets that was supposed to pro-
vide for the stability of the deposits “created” by the financial sys-
tem. It was this aspect that failed, since banks had already started
to expand into alternative investments, and the liquidity creation
function was usurped by other financial institutions using inno-
vations in securities markets that were exempt from regulations
applied to the deposit-creation acceptance function that allowed
regulated banks to create liquidity. Instead of seeking alternative
regulation of this means of liquidity creation, the response was
to allow all financial institutions to engage in effectively unreg-
ulated liquidity creation through securitization and structured
derivative products. The result was the loss of control over not
only liquidity creation but also the asset composition of bank
balance sheets.
Was there an alternative? One possibility would have been to
define the business of banking as the creation of liquidity
through the acceptance function of client liabilities. The expert-
ise of banking would then be returned to minimizing charge-
offs by improving the credit assessment of borrowers. All other
forms of liquidity creation—including market making, deriva-
tives, structured lending, and credit-enhanced special purpose
entities—would fall within the realm of investment banking.
Here, expertise would be in arbitraging market imperfections;
that is, risk, interest rates, exchange rates, and so forth. Under
such a division, money market mutual funds, which effectively
replicated the acceptance activities of banks, would have been aPublic Policy Brief, No. 107 14
permissible commercial bank activity rather than creating com-
petitive pressure. The point of departure would seem to be the
Supreme Court’s misinterpretation of a “note” as a securities
market instrument rather than as equivalent to a bank loan—an
interpretation that might have been avoided if liquidity creation
had been the defining principle. A strict initial application of the
functional equivalence principle to the 1933 definition of com-
mercial banking would have been the appropriate response. On
the other hand, asset-backed commercial paper could not have
been approved under the functional equivalence principle, since
it involves liquidity creation that is not produced by the accept-
ance function of the financial institution. Similarly, proprietary
trading by banks would not have been permitted, as it does not
produce any support for the acceptance function of liquidity cre-
ation for the bank’s liabilities (although it may do so for other
assets). Derivatives provision and trading would also be prohib-
ited, since they provide an alternative form of liquidity creation
that does not rely on the acceptance function but rather on the
creation of an unfunded liability. Similarly, other forms of asset-
backed securities would have been underwritten by a noninsured
entity such as an investment trust and regulated as an investment
company like any other. 
Another alternative would be to recognize that the
Constitution reserves the provision of currency to the govern-
ment, and there is no reason for the major part of this obligation
to be outsourced to the private sector.9The safekeeping of wealth
and transaction services could thus be provided as a public serv-
ice by a regulated utility—say, through a national giro payments
system—eliminating the need for deposit insurance and the
lender-of-last-resort function of the Federal Reserve. Both short-
and long-term finance and funding would then be provided by
private investment funds or trusts monitored by securities reg-
ulations, but without the need for a government guarantee.
Private savings would then limit investment financing and the
benefits of the banks’ acceptance function would be lost. The
conundrum noted above remains unresolved.
Notes
1.  This brief should be read in conjunction with Policy Note
2009/11 (Kregel 2009), which argues that the main problem
facing the U.S. financial system is banks that are not only
too big to fail but also multifunctional. This brief analyzes
the possibility of a restoration of Glass-Steagall separation as
a solution to multifunctional banks. Comments from
Thomas Ferguson, Rainer Kattel, and Mario Tonveronachi,
not all of which could be incorporated, are gratefully
acknowledged, without implicating them in the final result.
2.  This source has been chosen not because it is considered
correct but rather because it is representative of what the
courts have considered to be the essence of the New Deal
legislation and thus the basis for legal interpretation.
3.  Chairman Paul Volcker had initially voted against the liberal-
ization of section 20 but lost the vote; he resigned shortly
thereafter. Alan Greenspan took a very different view on the
issue. The Fed was under strong pressure from commercial
banks to allow them to increase their revenues from what were
increasingly lucrative securities activities; see Prins 204, 35.
4.  This is an issue that Minsky considered crucial but did not dis-
cuss at great length in his published work; see Minsky 2008. 
5.  Most of the legislative changes required to complete the
process were accomplished with the help of the government
agencies in the securitization of mortgages; see Ranieri 
1996, 31ff.
6.  On the original development of this practice of writing
matched-book repos, as well as the various frauds due to
lack of regulation, see Stigum 1978. On the role in the cur-
rent crisis, see Gorton 2009. The early developments of this
market drew Minsky’s attention in Minsky 1957. 
7.  It is the opinion of the board of directors of the FDIC that
the Banking Act of 1933, popularly known as the Glass-
Steagall Act and codified in various sections of Title 12 of the
United States Code, did not, by its terms, prohibit an insured
nonmember bank from establishing an affiliate relationship
with, or organizing or acquiring, a subsidiary corporation that
engages in the business of issuing, underwriting, selling or
distributing at wholesale or retail, or through syndicate par-
ticipation, stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other securi-
ties. While the Glass-Steagall Act was intended to protect
banks from certain of the risks inherent in particular securi-
ties activities, it did not reach the securities activities of aLevy Economics Institute of Bard College 15
bona fide subsidiary of an insured nonmember bank; see
www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/5000-1900.html.
8.  This language was originally introduced in section 8 of the
National Bank Act of 1863 granting national associations
“all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on
the business of banking” but made no reference at all to
securities; see Krooss 1969, 2:1386. There has been extended
debate concerning whether these powers are restricted to
those expressly mentioned in the law or are subject to inter-
pretation. In practice, the decision is left with the OCC, cre-
ated in the same legislation. A 1995 Supreme Court decision
(NationsBank of North Carolina, N.A. v. Variable Annuity
Life Insurance Co.) affirmed the OCC’s full power to inter-
pret section 8. 
9.  Indeed, many economists have seen this as the major source
of instability in the financial system. For example, Henry
Calvert Simons (1948 [1934], 54–55) notes the “usurpation
by private institutions (deposit banks) of the basic state
function of providing the medium of circulation (and of
private ‘cash’ reserves). It is no exaggeration to say that the
major proximate factor in the present crisis is commercial
banking. . . . Chaos arises from reliance by the state upon com-
petitive controls in a field (currency) where they cannot pos-
sibly work.”
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